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Abstract.  
The mobile cloud computing (MCC) has enriched the quality of services that the clients access from remote 
cloud-based servers. The growth in the number of wireless users for MCC has further augmented the 
requirement for a robust and efficient authenticated key agreement mechanism. Formerly, the users would 
access cloud services from various cloud-based service providers and authenticate one another only after 
communicating with the trusted third party (TTP). This requirement for the clients to access the TTP during 
each mutual authentication session, in earlier schemes, contributes to the redundant latency overheads for 
the protocol. Recently, Tsai et al. have presented a bilinear pairing based Multi-Server Authentication 
(MSA) protocol, to bypass the TTP, at least during mutual authentication. The scheme construction works 
fine, as far as the elimination of TTP involvement for authentication has been concerned. However, Tsai et 
al. scheme has been found vulnerable to server spoofing attack, De-synchronization attack, and lack smart 
card-based user verification, which renders the protocol inapt for practical implementation in different 
access networks. Hence, we have proposed an improved model designed with bilinear pairing operations, 
countering the identified threats as posed to Tsai scheme. Additionally, the proposed scheme is backed up 
by performance evaluation and formal security analysis. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The number of wireless gadgets is going to exceed the wired ones due to the flourishing mobile cloud 
computing environment, for about 50 percent of the total IP based traffic, by the end of year 2016. The 
mobile cloud computing environment enables the subscribers on the fly, to access the online cloud-based 
applications and services, which not only enhances the quality of service for clients, but also help 
generating revenues for the service providers. According to a report conducted by ABI [4-5], the number of 
mobile broadband users will exceed 5 billion till 2017, and this can be attributed to MCC. In MCC [1, 3], 
the cloud-based services may be accessed with the use of mobile devices employing Ethernet or 3G/4G 
based telecommunication links. A user may prompt for the use of cloud computing service, by employing a 
web browser or any sort of cloud service application installed on its mobile device. In that case, the user 
application and MCC service application mutually authenticate one another. In this connection, we can 
witness many authentication techniques introduced so far, for MCC [10-13]. As a matter of fact, these 
 protocols should be designed with the consideration of low computing devices, which also meet the 
security requisites [2, 6-9]. The security is of vital concern, as the messages pass through an insecure 
domain of WLAN or telecommunication links, where the attackers may easily intercept the messages to 
initiate several attacks. Besides, these authentication protocols should consider the privacy and identity 
based concerns. 
     It is hard to register all of the service providers and maintain multiple passwords for those services when 
there is more than one cloud computing service providers. The management of tens and hundreds of 
passwords for different service providers might be pretty troublesome for the users, in a distributed mobile 
cloud environment. In this regard, conventional single sign-on (SSO) protocols e.g., Passport and OpenID 
are one of the likely key management techniques [14-22]. The users can avail multiplicity of services, in 
those systems, by remembering just a single secret key or password. However, the majority of SSO based 
techniques engage a trusted party to establish an authenticated session. At the same time, OpenID a 
decentralized SSO protocol [26-33] is still being used by some major web-based service providers i.e., 
Yahoo and Google, for the management of nearly more than 50000 websites for authentication purpose. 
The three of the entities, i.e., user, relaying partner i.e., service provider (SP) and Identity provider (IdP) 
take part in the mutual authentication phase between user and service provider [53]. The RC and service 
provider can act as RC and SP to serve the user on alternate basis, in OpenID. A user who gets registered 
with IdP for OpenID identifier, could log into several websites, based on OpenID, that use Secure Socket 
Layer (SSL) protocol on a secure channel [32]. The user, while performing mutual authentication phase 
with SP, employ IdP, and it initially has to send a login request towards SP. The SP, after checking the 
OpenID identifier, forwards that authentication request towards IdP for further verification. The IdP 
verifies and acknowledges to user and SP, in case the identity is found legitimate in its repository. Next, the 
user and SP mutually authenticate each other. However, it might add further delay, if the IdP is burdened 
with too many awaiting authentication requests, which may further disturb the service provisioning of 
server. The employment of SSO would require a secure message transmission protocol to operate reliably 
in this environment. As we know that SSL rely on Rivest, Shamir and Adleman (RSA) for the purpose of 
authentication, which is public key cryptographic costly technique regarding computation. So it will be an 
expensive technique to employ in the system, in its current state. 
1.1 Objectives 
Thus, the objectives for this work are described as under: 
1) We need a less computational-intensive protocol for better practical implications.  
2) We require a control authority (RC in our scenario) that registers the subscribers initially, while those 
subscribers may benefit from the services of service providers, onwards.  
3) We need to select a low entropy password for user so it could be used to avail many services from 
various service providers, as warranted by multi-server authentication paradigm. The hassle of 
maintaining many passwords for several servers is relieved by employing this paradigm.   
4) In the last, we need to develop the protocol that does not rely on database verifiers at server’s end.  
 
1.2 Related Work 
The authentication being the most significant component in security properties enables the subscribers to 
avail secure network services. We may witness many recent public key cryptography-based authenticated 
key agreements involving DLP (Discrete Logarithm Problem) [52] and RSA etc. Nonetheless, these 
protocols were less effective for large key sizes. The Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) offers the same 
security strength in much lesser key size. i.e., the public-key size with 3072-bit for RSA offers an 
equivalent security strength as 256-bit public-key size of ECC does. The MCC gadgets requires less power 
consuming-security solutions, at the same time the elliptic curve cryptography is regarded as one of the best 
candidates for the frameworks requiring efficient wireless gadgets with less powerful processor.  
    Thus besides efficient cryptographic algorithms like ECC, DLP or Chebyshev map, we require a protocol 
that engages trusted third party merely in registration phase, but not in login and authentication phase. 
Likewise, we do not need to maintain a repository of password verifiers on the side of RC, At the same 
time, no password verifier table or database should be being maintained at RC’s end as maintaining those 
certificates needs overhead cost and may involve risk of stealing by any adversary.  
Meanwhile, to meet the above objectives, an identity based cryptosystem employing bilinear pairing 
operations is demonstrated by the researchers to achieve the aforementioned goals. In identity-based 
cryptography, the identity of subscriber acts as its public key, where the corresponding private key is 
constructed by a key central entity employing the related subscriber’s identity and is forwarded to that 
subscriber in registration procedure.  
     The identity based cryptography foregoes the requirement to confirm the validity of public key of some 
subscriber using any public key certificate or asking any assistance from some external source, or keeping 
the certificate in its database for some period. We could witness several applications of identity based 
cryptography in internet of things, cloud computing, grid computing, wireless sensor networks, and group 
signatures, etc. Initially, in 2004 for grid computing the related identity based scheme was pioneered by 
Lim and Robshaw [21, 22]. Thereafter, Mao [23] also presented an ID-based protocol in Grid. Thereafter, 
Li et al. [24] came up with another ID-based authenticated key agreement protocol for cloud environment, 
yet it does not provide anonymity-based features [25, 35, 51].  
   Mostly, the authentication protocols are based on single-server authentication paradigms that render these 
protocols unable to fit in multi-server environment. In such multi-server environment-based protocols, a 
subscriber does not need to remember more than one password as much as the number of servers [56]. A 
user might benefit from services of various service providers using a single password. Previously, a user 
seeks to consult TTP each time it acquires the services of service provider. In addition, we observe that 
there are few protocols that share a single master key among all servers in a network that might enable the 
adversary, a malicious server, to initiate impersonation attack. So these previous schemes are unable to 
address the problems, although these were efficient in terms of computation. In multi-server authentication, 
Li et al. [61] presented the pioneer concept about this authentication paradigm. Thereafter, Lin et al. [62] 
criticized the above scheme for neural network-based implementation and presented its own scheme. Next, 
Cao and Zhong [63] found impersonation attacks in [62] and presented another improved scheme. 
Likewise, many symmetric key schemes were presented in a row. Later, public-key cryptography based 
schemes were demonstrated involving ECC and RSA-based operations. Regarding this, Yoon and Yoo [64] 
presented a novel multi-server authentication scheme. Nonetheless, Yoon and Yoo’s protocol is vulnerable 
to impersonation attacks. Afterwards, He and Wang [65] put another efficient protocol employing ECC 
operations. Thereafter, Odelu et al. [66] discovered that He and Wang protocol does not provide anonymity 
and is also susceptible to few attacks. All of the above mentioned schemes could not fulfill the requirement 
of multi-server authentication. Still there was requirement for a secure, efficient and anonymous protocol in 
multi-server paradigm. In this context, lately Tsai et al. [34] proposed a bilinear pairing-based 
authentication scheme for mobile cloud computing. We discover that it suffers from server spoofing or 
impersonation threat and de-synchronization threat. Besides, it also lacks smart card verification which 
renders the protocol ineffective for implementation. In this study, we review Tsai et al.’s protocol besides 
crypt-analyzing the scheme. Then we propose an enhanced mobile user authenticated key agreement 
protocol for mobile cloud computing environment that employs the bilinear pairing operations. Finally our 
contributed scheme presents performance evaluation analysis along with formal security analysis.   
 
1.3 Threat Model   
We assume few assumptions regarding an adversary Ӑ under the current threat model: 
1) An adversary may intercept and examine the contents exchanged on a public channel among the 
legitimate parties.  
 2) The adversary might could manipulate the contents, i.e. delete, replay or alter the contents during the 
communication.  
3) The adversary might be a privileged or legitimate malicious insider in an organization.   
4) It is also supposed that adversary knows about the protocol. 
5) The adversary is capable of guessing low-entropy strings including passwords and identities; 
nonetheless, it might not guess high-entropy random numbers in polynomial amount of time. 
6) In the last, the adversary could steal and manipulate the smart card details. 
 
1.4 Paper layout 
 This paper is organized as follows: The section 2 illustrates the preliminary details regarding this paper. 
The section 3 relates to reviewing and cryptanalysis for Tsai et al.’s protocol. Section 4 demonstrates our 
contributed scheme. Section 5 and 6 depicts informal and formal security discussion and analysis, along 
with performance evaluation analysis. Finally, the conclusion is presented.     
  
2 PRELIMINARIES 
We briefly take a review of ID-based protocol working, bilinear pairing operation, bio-hashing operation, 
and hash digest function in this section. 
 
2.1  ID-based protocol framework 
The Figure 1 depicts the ID-based protocol environment, where each user, in the beginning, registers 
with the Registration Centre (RC). In registration process, smart card is issued by RC bearing the 
private key as generated by the RC based on the identity of the user. Thereafter, the user avails the 
required services from various service providers, by login and authentication procedure using the 
same account as established with RC. Here, the subscriber may authenticate itself with server S, only 
through engaging RC during each session. At times, this frequent communication on regular basis 
becomes a bottleneck, as the user has to face extra communication delay, whenever it needs to avail 
or acquire any service from any service provider. 
 
 
Fig. 1. User and Server Authentication Steps employing OpenID 
 
 2.2  Bilinear Pairing Operation 
In bilinear pairing [62], there are two well-known types, the Weil pairings or Tate pairings that are utilized 
for identity based cryptography. We take (G1, +) as an additive cyclic group, while (G2, ×) as multiplicative 
cyclic group, and the symbol P being a generator of G1 group. The bilinear mapping such as  
e: G1 × G1 →G2 bears the understated properties: 
1. Bilinear: For all D, E, F ϵ G1 , e(D+E, F) = e(D,F) × e(E,F) and e(D, E+F)=e(D,E) × e(D,F). 
2. Non-degeneracy:  Supposedly, 1 being an identity element for multiplicative cyclic-group G2, then this 
group holds the feature as D, E ϵ G1, where e(D, E) ≠ 1. 
3. Computability: There exist an algorithm to compute e(D, E) for D, E corresponding to G1. 
 
2.3 Bio-hashing 
 The Biohashing function [49] takes the subscriber’s biometric properties and maps it on randomly 
generated vectors that further enable to produce a particular user code called as biocode. This code enables 
in generating one or zero-based discrete projection coefficients. This Bio-hashing function works much 
alike hashed password, however more secure for covering biometric aspects. Jina et al. first employed two-
factor-based authenticator and iterated inner products to generate token-based pseudo random integers and 
unique biometric features and ultimately the compact codes. After Jina et al. [49], Lumini and Nanni [50] 
developed this concept as an updated biohashing technique.  
 
2.4 Hash digest function 
 
The hash digest function, say h: (x→y) bears the under-mentioned characteristics: 
1. The hash digest function h takes input an integer or character-based string of arbitrary length and 
generates another string of fixed length. 
2. With the given function h(x)=y, it is hard to calculate h-1(y)=x in polynomial amount of time. 
3. With the given integer u, it is hard to output x', such that x' is not equal to x, nonetheless h(x') remains 
equal to h(x); 
4. Lastly, it is hard to find a pair x, x' provided x' is not equal to x, and h(x') is equal to h(x). 
 
 
3 REVIEW OF TSAI ET AL. SCHEME WITH CRYPTANALYSIS 
The Tsai et al.’s protocol [34] consists of three participants in multi-server system, i.e. user (Ui), server 
(SPj) and Registration centre (RC). Here, we use the term RC instead of IdP or smart card generator (SCG) 
in Tsai et al. scheme. The participants, i.e. Ui and SPj perform registration procedure initially on secret 
channel, and then these may mutually authenticate one another on public channel without engaging the 
registration centre. In this section, we first illustrate the system setup for Tsai et al.’s protocol [34] and then 
describe its working and critical analysis.  We narrate few symbols in Table I that have been used in this 
paper.  
3.1 System Initialization  
 We take a cyclic additive-group as G1 which is build on P generator, while a cyclic multiplicative group as  
G2, where the integer p describes the prime order for both groups. First, the registration centre chooses s as 
its master key and generates the corresponding public key i.e. Ppub =sP. Afterwards, it calculates e(P, P) 
and bilinear pairing functions such as e: G1 × G1  →G2, besides some hash digest functions as H1: Zp→Zp, 
H2:G2 →Zp, H3:Zp→Zp, H4:Zp→Zp, h:Zp→G1. Ultimately, registration centre make public these parameters 
as {e, h, Ppub, P, H1 - H4, e(P,P)}. 
 Table I. Notations description 
Symbols Meanings 
Ui, SPj, RC ith User, jth Service provider, Registration Centre 
IDi , IDj Identities of user and server 
PWi, bi Password and biometric finger impression of Ui 
e:  G1×G1 → G2 G1 and G2 are additive and multiplicative-cyclic 
groups in a bilinear mapping 
Ki, Kj: User’s private secret , Server’s private secret 
H1(IDi), H1(IDj) User’s public key, Server’s public key 
s, Ppub Private and public key of Registration Centre 
u, v Server’s and user’s temporary secrets 
SC Smart Card 
Hb() Bio-hashing function 
H() Private hash-digest function 
h(.) A secure hash function 
, || XOR operation, Concatenation operation 
+ Point Addition operation 
 
3.2   Tsai et al.’s scheme working [34] 
The Tsai et al. based protocol comprises three sub-phases such as registration, mutual authentication phase.  
3.2.1  Registration Phase 
In this procedure, user or server submits registration request towards registration centre. Once the latter 
receives the registration request, it constructs the private keys for user and server by utilizing master key s 
receiving the request as given under:  
𝐾𝑖 =
1
𝑠 +   𝐻1(𝐼𝐷𝑖)
 𝑃 
 
Subsequently, the registration centre submits the 𝐾𝑖 factor to user or server using a confidential channel. 
The Ui, after getting the private secret from registration centre, calculates Ei= Ki h( PWi || bi).  Onwards, 
it deposits the parameter Ei on smart card, here PWi symbolizes as password and bi as the user’s 
fingerprint. Similarly, SPj stores the received private key in its memory for future use.  
 
3.2.2 Mutual Authentication Steps: 
1.   Primarily, in this sub-phase, Ui submits login query towards server. 
2.   Then, the server calculates Z = e(P, P)u and submits towards user. 
3.   The user then, calculates Kij, L2, X, Ri and M1 as follows: 
 
Kij = H2 (Z v) = H2 (e(P,P)uv)         (1) 
L2 = vPpub + H1 (IDj)vP,           (2) 
X =vPpub + H1 (IDi)vP,              (3) 
Ri = 
𝟏
𝒗+𝑯𝟑 (𝑰𝑫𝒊 ||𝒁||𝑰𝑫𝒋 || 𝑿 || 𝑲𝒊𝒋)
 Ki       (4) 
M1 = Kij  (IDi || Ri || X)               (5) 
In the above equation, v is taken as a random integer, while the user constructs the above factors and 
submits <L2, M1> to server. The factor v might be pre-selected, and similarly the other computed factors as 
 vPpub, vP, and vH1(IDi)P before the login and authentication process is initiated, for reducing the 
computational cost of protocol.  
4.   After getting the message <L2, M1> of user, the server calculates session key Kij as shown below. 
Kij = H2 (e (L2, Kj)u)=H2 ( e(P, P)uv )                            (6) 
Next, the server extracts (IDi || Ri || X) after calculating (IDi || Ri || X) = Kij  (M1). The server, thereafter, 
calculates e(Ri, X + H3 (IDi || Z || IDj || X || Kij) Yi) and verifies this with the parameter e(P, P), for 
instance, 
e(Ri, X + H3 (IDi ||Z||IDj ||X ||Kij)Yi) ?= e(P, P)         (7) 
While, Yi is calculated as Yi = (Ppub + H1 ( IDi ) P). Then, the server calculates Gi = H4 (Kij || Z || IDi || IDj) 
and submits Gi to Ui.  
5.   The user gets Gi and calculates Gi' as  
Gi' = H4 (Kij || Z || IDi || IDj)                                        (8) 
Further, it matches the parameter Gi' against Gi. If the equality is successful, then the Ui authenticates SPj 
as a legitimate server.  
 
3.3   Review of Tsai et al.’s protocol 
 
The Tsai et al.’s protocol is a MCC-based mobile user authenticated key agreement protocol employing 
bilinear pairing operations. Nonetheless, the Tsai et al.’s protocol is discovered to be susceptible to server 
impersonation attack, de-synchronization attack, and also lack smart card-based user verification, as 
described below. 
  
3.3.1 Server Impersonation Threat 
 
The attacker Ӑ might initiate an impersonation or spoofing attack against any subscriber after 
impersonating as SPj, employing the under-mentioned steps.  
1. An attacker, upon intercepting the login query from any subscriber, may construct Z by calculating a 
bilinear map as given in equation (9). The factor Z is then submitted to Ui. 
   Z = e(Ppub + H1 (IDj) P,P)u                           (9) 
2. Then, Ui gets Z from attacker, considering it as a legal SPj, and calculates Kij, L2, X, Ri and M1.  
        Kij = H2 (Z v) = H2 (e(P, P)uv),   (10) 
        L2 = vPpub + H1 (IDj)vP,    (11) 
        X = vPpub + H1 (IDi)vP,    (12) 
        Ri = 
𝟏
𝒗+𝑯𝟑 (𝑰𝑫𝒊 ||𝒁 ||𝑰𝑫𝒋 || 𝑿 || 𝑲𝒊𝒋)
Ki   (13) 
        M1 = Kij  (IDi || Ri || X),   (14) 
 
Next, Ui submits <L2, M1> towards SPj in order to verify and authenticate it, as seized by Ӑ.  
3. Afterwards, Ӑ gets the message <L2, M1> and calculates the parameter Kij* using L2, u and P as 
depicted in (15). 
          Kij* = H2(e(L2, P)u)                   (15) 
4. The attacker computes the identity of user as IDi using equation (16).  
          (IDi || Ri || X) = Kij*  M1   (16) 
Then the attacker calculates Gi* and submits toward user in response to Ui’s challenge as depicted in 
equation (17).  
        Gi* = H4 (Kij* || Z || IDi || IDj)                     (17) 
5. Thereafter, Ui gets Gi* from the attacker Ӑ, and calculates Gi = H4 (Kij || Z || IDi ||IDj). Now Ui 
verifies the authenticity by comparing parameters Gi* and Gi. If it is successful, Ui authenticates the 
attacker as a legitimate server, however fake.    
 
3.3.2 Loose synchronization 
In Tsai et al.’s protocol, registration sub-phase employs the biometric smart card input without using any 
type of biometric capturing algorithm such as biohashing [49, 50] or fuzzy extractor [55]. Since, the Tsai et 
al.’s protocol calculates the parameter Ei =Ki h(PWi || bi) through utilizing the biometric input bi barely 
in the hash operation escaping any kind of pre-dealing algorithm or tool. This becomes the basis for the de-
synchronization threat [56], since the stored biometric-template does not match with the current biometric-
input; this is because the pre-dealing tools were not used. The use of such pre-dealing tools is crucial as we 
always observe significant amount of noise in the capturing of biometric inputs during registration and 
mutual authentication phase. In this manner we may avoid de-synchronization attacks.    
 
3.3.3 Non-verification of smart card  
In Tsai et al.’s protocol, the smart card is unable to authenticate the user in login phase before submitting 
the authentication request message to server. Due to this limitation, the service provider might come under 
Denial-of-Service (DoS) threat by inputting invalid password (PWi*) and biometric input (Bi*), in case the 
attacker steals over the smart card contents. Then, the smart card may construct Ki* if the fake input 
parameters are given as input. The card then further constructs Ri*, and finally produces <L2*, M1*> 
message. Here, one point is worth mentioning that the service provider could refuse the authentication 
request after comparing equation (7), yet the server’s energy gets drained for number of repeated 
computations. There might even be some legal users behaving maliciously to affect the server performance.  
3.3.4 Other drawbacks in Tsai et al.’s protocol 
In mutual authentication phase of Tsai et al.’s protocol, the smart card employs the private secret ‘Ki’ in 
various calculations without extracting it from the parameter Ei i.e.,  𝑲𝒊 = Eih(PWi || bi).    
             
4 PROPOSED MODEL 
We propose this enhanced and improved protocol after ascertaining few limitations in Tsai et al.’s scheme. 
In proposed model, likewise the user and service provider perform registration process prior to becoming 
part of the system. Thereafter, these entities could authenticate one another without engaging the 
registration centre as depicted in Figure 2. This contributed scheme is composed of three sub-sections, such 
as Registration, mutual authentication phase, and password modification sub-phase. The system set up of 
the proposed model takes the same assumptions as illustrated in section 3.1.  
 
4.1  Registration Phase 
All users and service providers are registered in this phase.  For this purpose, the candidate users or servers 
submit their requests to registration centre. Once the RC receives the corresponding the request, it further 
 constructs the private key for the respective user or server candidates, employing its own master secret key 
s as illustrated below. 
   𝑲𝒊 = 
𝟏
𝒔+𝑯𝟏(𝒉(𝑰𝑫𝒊))
 𝑷       (18) 
 
 
Figure 2. Proposed MSA protocol architecture eliminating RC from mutual authentication phase 
 
The registration now submits Ki or Kj factors towards user or server on confidential channel. Once, these 
entities receive their respective private key from registration centre, the user computes Ei =Ki h(PWi || Hb 
(bi)). Then, the user stores the parameter Ei on smart card. In the calculation of Ei, PWi represents 
password, and bi be the biometric input from Ui. Similarly, the server upon getting the private secret key 
from registration centre, stores in its memory safely.  
 
4.2 Login and Authentication procedure 
The user performs the following steps when it wants to get mutually authenticated with server.  
1. For mutual authentication, the user initially inputs its identity (IDi) and password (PWi). Next, it 
imprints its biometric parameter (Bi*) and also calculates Di'= h(h(PWi ||IDi) || Hb (bi)). Next, it 
compares the equality for Di' ?= Di. If it fails to match, the protocol shall be aborted. On the other 
hand, the user submits the login query towards server SPj. 
2. Onwards, the server constructs Z = e(P, P)u and forwards to user.  
3. The user, then calculates the parameters Kij, L2, X, Ri and M1 as given below: 
 
           𝑲𝒊  = Ei  h(PWi  || Hb(bi))                        (19) 
              Kij = H2 (Z v) = H2 (e(P,P)uv)                     (20) 
 L2 = vPpub + H1 (h(IDj))vP,       (21) 
           X =vPpub + H1 (h(IDi))vP,                        (22) 
           Ri = 
𝟏
𝒗+𝑯𝟑 (𝒉(𝑰𝑫𝒊)||𝑳𝟐 ||𝒁 || 𝒉(𝑰𝑫𝒋)|| 𝑿 || 𝑲𝒊𝒋)
 Ki              (23) 
            M1 = Kij  (h(IDi)|| Ri || X)                       (24) 
The user constructs the above factors and forwards <L2, M1> to server, where v is a random integer. Even, v 
could be selected beforehand, likewise, other parameters vPpub, vP, and H1(IDi)vP may also be constructed 
before the mutual authentication phase, which helps to minimize the computational cost of the system 
protocol.  
 4. After getting the message < L2, M1> from user, the server calculates the session key Kij primarily, as 
following. 
                   Kij = H2 (e (L2, Kj)u)=H2(e(P, P)uv)              (25) 
Then server computes (h(IDi)|| Ri || X) by calculating (h(IDi)|| Ri || X) = Kij  M1. The server, thereafter, 
calculates e(Ri, X + H3 (h(IDi)|| Z || h(IDj)||X || Kij) Yi) and checks the equality against the already 
calculated parameter e(P, P), for instance, 
e(Ri, X + H3 (h(IDi)|| 𝑳𝟐 ||Z || h(IDj)||X ||Kij) Yi) ?= e(P, P)      (26) 
Where the factor Yi is calculated as Yi = (Ppub+H1(h(IDi))P). Here, the server authenticates the subscriber 
positively as shown in Eq (26). Then, server calculates L3 and Qi as shown in the Eq (27) and (28). Next, it 
submits the content < L3, Qi> towards user, in this manner the service provider could also be authenticated 
by Ui.  
            L3 = uPpub + H1 (h(IDi))uP                                  (27) 
          Qi= H4(Kij || Z || L3 || h(IDi)|| h(IDj))                             (28) 
5. Then, the user gets <L3, Qi > and computes Kij' and verifies Qi with the computation as shown in Eq 
(30)  
           Kij'=H2(e (L3, Ki )v)                                      (29) 
          Qi  ?= H4(Kij' || Z || L3 || h(IDi)|| h(IDj))           (30) 
If the Eq (30) holds valid, the subscriber authenticates the service provider. Alternatively, it will terminate 
the session. Therefore, both of the participating entities authenticate one another and construct the agreed 
session key, i.e. SK = Kij.  
4.3    Password Alteration Procedure 
The subscriber may transform its old password (PWi) into a new one as (PWinew) after initiating the under-
mentioned steps. The former may alter PWi without seeking any help from registration centre. The 
corresponding steps for this modification are given as under: 
1) The user initially enters its IDi and PWi as input in smart card. Then, it imprints its biometric 
impression bi in biometric scanner and chooses to modify its password.   
2) After that, the smart card calculates Di* = h(h(PWi ||IDi) || Hb (bi)) and confirms the equation for Di*  
?= Di. In case, it is not valid the smart would decline the password modification request. On the other 
hand, it shall allow the user to progress with the password updation procedure.  
3) Next, the smart card calculates the parameter Ki=Ei h( PWi ||Hb(bi)) and asks the user to enter its 
new password (PWinew). 
4) Then, it calculates the values Dinew =h(h(PWinew || IDi ) ||Hb (bi)) and Einew= Ki h( PWinew ||Hb (bi)).  
5) Ultimately, the card shall replace the parameters Di, Ei against the modified Dinew and Einew 
parameters. 
 
 
5. SECURITY ANALYSIS  
The security analysis for the proposed model has been described below: 
5.1 Resists Replay Attack 
The replay attacks could be instigated while an adversary reproduces the same content in various timings to 
betray any valid member entity. The attacker adversary Ӑ intercepts publicly available messages < Z> , < 
 L2, M1> , < L3, Qi>  and might attempt to replay those contents to any one of the legitimate members. If an 
attacker replays either < Z>  or < L3, Qi >  contents towards user then the latter may recognize in 4th step of 
login and authentication procedure after matching the equation Qi  ?= H4(Kij' || Z || L3 || h(IDi)|| h(IDj))  as 
depicted in Eq (30). If the equation does not match, Ui would consider this message as a replayed message 
or attack. Similarly, on replaying the content <L2, M1> , the server checks the validity after matching the 
equation (26), i.e. 
 e(Ri, X + H3 (h(IDi)|| L2 || Z || h(IDj)|| X || Kij) Yi) ?= e(P, P). In case, this equality fails to match, this will 
be taken as replay threat from server. Thus, our protocol could comfortably counter this attack. 
 
5.2  Resists Modification  
The modification or man-in-the-middle attack may be initiated if the adversary alters the message details, 
being unauthorized, for presenting it to some legal server or user so that those legitimate members 
misleadingly take them as original participants. If an adversary attempts to alter the contents < Z> , < L2 , 
M1> or < L3 , Qi>, then user or server might comfortably prevent this threat after matching the equation 
e(Ri, X + H3 (h(IDi)|| L2 || Z || h(IDj)|| X || Kij) Yi) ?= e(P, P) and Qi  ?= H4 (Kij' || Z || L3 || h(IDi)|| h(IDj)) for 
SPj and Ui, respectively, as depicted in equations (26) and (30). In this context, we might infer that our 
protocol is protected from MiTM attack from both sides.  
    
5.3 Resists offline-Password Guessing Attack 
An attacker Ӑ might attempt to guess the password (PWi) out of the intercepted or stolen contents of smart 
card [45]. The smart card comprises Di=h(h(PWi ||IDi) ||Hb (bi)) and Ei = 𝑲𝒊  h(PWi || Hb (bi)) factors, 
nonetheless, Ӑ still cannot extract or compute the password out of Ei or Di, as the attacker has no 
knowledge about a high entropy random secret bi. Therefore, if we concatenate the identity and bi, the 
password could not be calculated in polynomial amount of time by the attacker. In this context, our scheme 
is protected from any sort of password or identity guessing attack.  
 
5.4 Session key security 
The adversary Ӑ could steal the contents of smart card or it may intercept the public messages. Then, it 
may use these contents to calculate the legitimate session key as SK ={Kij}= {Kij'}  from the available 
parameters. Nonetheless, Ӑ may not be able to calculate SK as the computation needs the availability of x 
and y factors, while the computation of those factors by the attacker is bound by the hardness of ECDLP 
problem [15]. Therefore, the contents stolen by the adversary on an insecure channel could not expose the 
valid session keys constructed between the legal participants.  
5.5   Resists Impersonation / Server spoofing attack 
An attacker Ӑ, being a malicious server, might attempt to originate a spoofing attack against user. 
Nonetheless, unlike the scheme Tsai et al., if Ӑ forwards a fabricated factor Z i.e., Z = e( Ppub+ H1(h(IDj))P, 
P)u to Ui, the later could comfortably discern the possibility of threat in 4th step of login and authentication 
phase of our scheme, after matching the equation (30). If Ӑ would attempt to initiate this attack, the 
adversary would not be able to pass the equality for Qi  ?= H4 (Kij' || Z ||L3|| h(IDi)|| h(IDj)), and then Ui will 
terminate the session. Therefore, in our scheme the entities validate the authenticity of one another while 
the adversary may not be able to initiate any kind of server impersonation attack.  
 
5.6 Known-Key Security 
This feature warrants the incapability of the adversary of guessing past session keys if the current session 
key is exposed. In our scheme, even if the attacker becomes familiar about the session key SK= {Kij} of any 
session, it might not assist the attacker in determining the rest of the session keys among the similar 
 members, since a unique random integer involves in every session establishment phase between the same 
members.  For this reason, it becomes an intractable problem for the adversary to approach the related 
secret factors, as nearly as ECDLP-based hard problem. Consequently, our protocol supports the feature of 
known-key security. 
 
5.7 Perfect Forward secrecy  
This feature warrants the secrecy of session keys exposure once the attacker is able to approach the private 
secret keys of control authority, for example, the registration centre in our scenario.  
In our protocol, in case the adversary approaches the private secret key (s) of RC, it may calculate the 
private secrets of the involved Ui and SPj, i.e. 𝑲𝒊 and 𝑲𝒋, after getting access to identities (IDi, IDj) of user 
or server IDi, IDj also depicted in equation (31) and (32). 
   𝑲𝒊 =
𝟏
𝒔+𝑯𝟏(𝒉(𝑰𝑫𝒊))
 𝑷        (31) 
 
   𝑲𝒋 =
𝟏
𝒔+𝑯𝟏(𝒉(𝑰𝑫𝒋))
 𝑷    (32) 
However, it may not compute the session key SK = {Kij} as the calculation for Kij factors, regardless of the 
information about 𝑲𝒊 and 𝑲𝒋, needs additionally the knowledge about the parameters of a specific session, 
such as x or y to calculate the session key Kij. In addition, the attacker might not be able to recover those 
factors out of M1  i.e., M1 = Kij  (h(IDi)|| Ri || X) due to ignorance of information about Ri and X factors. 
Thus, our protocol supports the feature of perfect forward secrecy. 
 
5.8 Mutual Authentication 
This property suggests that both of the interacting participants verify and validate one another within the 
same protocol. In our protocol, the server authenticates the user after receiving the request <A> submitted 
by the user and the challenge response as received from user. The server calculates bilinear map and 
verifies it with the computer parameter e(P, P) as depicted in equation (26), in this manner it validates the 
user. Likewise, Ui verifies the server after calculating bilinear map and matching the parameter Qi with H4 
(Kij' || Z || h(IDi)|| h(IDj)) as depicted in equation (30). Following this, the user and server may authenticate 
one another in the protocol.  
 
5.9   Anonymous Authentication 
This feature affords anonymity to user besides getting it authenticated out of service provider. After a 
successful anonymous authentication the adversary may not infer about the identity of any of the 
participating entities by using the intercepted parameters. In our scheme, the adversary might not be able to 
recover the Ui’s identity out of the publicly available messages of various sessions, as the identity (IDi ) is 
included in the construction of M1, i.e., M1 = Kij  (h(IDi)|| Ri || X), besides it is embedded after taking hash 
in M1 parameter. This is least probable to recover and guess those secrets, i.e. u, v and ultimately the 
session key is computed or approached in polynomial amount of time. As a result, the demonstrated 
scheme affords sufficient authenticity and anonymity to the user.   
 
5.10  Resist de-synchronisation threat 
This attack might be possible by the attacker if the latter alters the contents in a manner that the valid 
members could not authenticate each other, and then they have to terminate the session. This may lead to 
desynchronization attack while the adversary changes the contents such that the legitimate members may 
not verify one another, and will have to terminate the session in mutual authentication. In our scheme, if 
attacker attempts to alter the content < Z>, <L2, M1>, <L3, Qi>, the Ui could counter this threat after 
 calculating Kij' =H2 (e(L3, Ki)v) and checking the equation Qi  ?= H4 (Kij' || Z ||L3 || h(IDi) || h(IDj) as 
revealed in equation (29). This is because of the fact that the calculated factor Kij' does not match Qi against 
H4 (Kij' || Z || L3 || h(IDi || h(IDj), which prevents the attackers to launch the modification attack. At the 
same time, the De-synchronization attack might happen on the mismatch of stored biometric template with 
the same biometric imprint in the login process. In proposed scheme, we employed bio-hashing to remove 
the probability of mismatch out of noise in direct biometric application without any pre-dealing tool. 
Hence, the de-synchronization attack, in both ways, may be detected and foiled successfully in proposed 
scheme. 
 
6 FORMAL SECURITY ANALYSIS  
We demonstrate the security analysis formally in this section by employing the Burrows-Abadi-Needham 
logic (BAN) logic [36, 37] technique and also random oracle model. The first model analyzes the protocol 
on account of few parameters including key distribution, mutual authentication, and immunity strength for 
session key exposure. Next, we illustrate few notations that are utilized in proving the protocol using BAN 
logic.  
ƒ  |≡  ɀ: ƒ believes the message ɱ. 
ƒ  ⊲  ɱ: ƒ sees the message ɱ. 
ƒ  |~  ɱ: ƒ once said ɱ. 
ƒ  ⇒  ɱ: ƒ has jurisdiction over ɱ. 
♯  (ɱ):  ɱ is fresh. 
⟨ ɱ ⟩ɱ': ɱ is combined with another ɱ'.  
(ɱ,  ɱ'): ɱ or ɱ' are parts of a message (ɱ, ɱ'). 
{ ɱ,  ɱ'}K: ɱ or ɱ' is encrypted using the key K. 
ƒ 
      𝐊        
↔     ƒ':  ƒ and ƒ' communicate utilizing a shared key K. 
 (ɱ, ɱ')K: ɱ or ɱ' is hashed by key K. 
 
Some rules that are used in the proof of BAN logic are given as following: 
Rule 1. Message-meaning rule: 
ƒ |≡ ƒ 
𝐾
↔ ƒ′,   ƒ ⊲ ⟨ɱ⟩ɱ′
ƒ |≡ƒ′ |~ ɱ
 
Rule 2. Nonce-verification rule: 
ƒ |≡ ♯ (ɱ),   ƒ |≡ƒ′ |~  ɱ
ƒ |≡ƒ′ |≡  ɱ
 
Rule 3. Jurisdiction rule: 
ƒ|≡ƒ′ ⇒ɱ,   ƒ|≡ƒ′ |≡  ɱ
ƒ|≡ ɱ
 
Rule 4. Freshness-conjuncatenation rule: 
ƒ|≡ ♯ (ɱ)
ƒ|≡ ♯ (ɱ,   ɱ′)
 
Rule 5. Belief rule: 
ƒ |≡ (ɱ),   ƒ|≡ (ɱ′)  
ƒ |≡(ɱ,   ɱ′) 
 
Rule 6. Session-keys rule:  
ƒ|≡ ♯ (ɱ),   ƒ|≡ƒ′ |≡  ɱ
ƒ|≡ƒ 
K
↔ ƒ′
 
 
The contributed scheme requires satisfying the under-mentioned goals (G1-G4) for ensuring the security 
using BAN logic, employing the postulates as mentioned above.  
 
G1 : S |≡ Ui  
       𝑆𝐾       
↔      S 
G2 : S |≡  Ui |≡ Ui  
       𝑆𝐾       
↔      S 
G3 : Ui |≡  Ui  
       𝑆𝐾       
↔      S 
G4 : Ui |≡  S |≡ Ui 
       𝑆𝐾       
↔      S 
 
 We may transform the communicated messages in our scheme into idealized form as given below: 
 
m1: Ui → S:  L2, M1:  ⟨IDi, Ri, vPpub + H1 (h(IDi)).vP ⟩Kij 
m2: S → Ui: L3, Qi:  ⟨ IDj,  uPpub + H1 (h(IDi)).uP ⟩ Kij'  
Secondly, the following premises have been established to prove the security of our scheme. 
 
P1 :  Ui  |≡  ♯ v 
P2 :  S  |≡  ♯ (u, Z) 
P3 : Ui |≡ S  
       𝐾𝑖𝑗       
↔       Ui   
P4 : S |≡ S 
       𝐾𝑖𝑗′      
↔       Ui   
P5 : Ui |≡ S  ⇒  ( uPpub + H1 (h(IDi)).uP)  
P6 : S |≡ Ui  ⇒ (Ri, vPpub + H1 (h(IDj)).vP)  
Thirdly, the mentioned idealized form such as m1 and m2 in the contributed scheme may be evaluated and 
verified with the help of postulates as illustrated above.   
By using the above mentioned symbols, postulates, assumptions and idealized forms, we come to the 
understated derivations: 
Regarding the first idealized form, we have: 
m1: Ui → S:  L2, M1:  ⟨IDi, Ri, vPpub + H1 (h(IDj)).vP ⟩Kij  
 
On the basis of the seeing rule, we have the following derivation 
D1: S ⊲ L2,M1: ⟨ IDi, Ri, vPpub + H1 (h(IDj)).vP ⟩Kij 
According to D1, P3 and message-meaning-rule,  
D2: S |≡ Ui ~ (Ri, vPpub + H1 (h(IDj)).vP) 
In relation to P2, D2, Rule4, and Rule2, we have 
D3: S  |≡  Ui  |≡  (Ri, vPpub + H1 (h(IDj)).vP)  
Here, (IDi, Ri, vPpub+H1 (h(IDj)).vP) are few significant factors required to mutually authenticate the 
participants and calculating the session key SK = {Kij}. 
In relation to P6, D3, and Rule3 
D4: S  |≡  (Ri, vPpub + H1 (h(IDj)).vP) 
In relation to P3, D4, and Rule 6, we have 
D5: S |≡ Ui |≡ S 
       𝑆𝐾       
↔      Ui   (G2) 
In relation to P6, D5, and Rule 3 
D6: S |≡ Ui  
       𝑆𝐾       
↔      S    (G1) 
Regarding the 2nd message of constructed idealized form, we have:  
m2: S → Ui: L3, Qi:  ⟨ IDj,  uPpub + H1 (h(IDi)).uP ⟩ Kij'  
 
On the application of Rule  the seeing rule, we have 
D7: Ui ⊲ S → Ui: L3, Qi: ⟨IDj, uPpub +H1(h(IDi)).uP ⟩Kij' 
In relation to D7, P4 and Rule 1,  
D8: Ui  |≡  S ~ (uPpub + H1 (h(IDi)).uP) 
In relation to D8, P1, Rule 4, and Rule 2, we have, 
D9: Ui  |≡  S  |≡  (uPpub + H1 (h(IDi)).uP) 
 Here, (uPpub + H1 (h(IDi)).uP) are significant factors utilized in authenticating the participants and verifying 
the computer factor Kij' that is utilized in the computation of session key SK = {Kij} = { Kij'}. 
In relation to P5, D9, and Rule 3 
D10: Ui |≡  (uPpub + H1 (h(IDi)).uP) 
In relation to P4, D10, and Rule 6, we have 
D11: Ui |≡ S |≡ Ui  
       𝑆𝐾       
↔      S    (G4) 
In accordance with P5, D11, and the Jurisdiction rule 
D12: Ui |≡ Ui  
       𝑆𝐾       
↔      S         (G3) 
 
We prove formally by using BAN logic analysis that our contributed scheme may attain the property of 
mutual authentication, while the constructed session key (SK) is established on mutual basis between user 
and server.  
    Besides the above proof, we might use a random oracle model (ROM) which is generally known as a 
generic contradiction model in cryptography [48], to prove that the existing scheme is secure enough to 
construct a mutually authenticated session key.  To prove the protocol by using the above defined model, 
we employed two oracles such as Reveal1 and Reveal2 as given below:  
Reveal1: The oracle Reveal1 will generate a out of the related bilinear map Z = e(P,P)a in absolute terms.  
Reveal2: The oracle Reveal2 produces t out of related hash value u=h(t), absolutely. 
The Reveal1 oracle is employed for the Algorithm 1. 𝐸𝑋𝑃1𝑰𝑴𝑺𝑨𝑫𝑴𝑪𝑪𝑺
𝐾𝑒𝑦
 specifying the exposure of session 
key SK if the oracle Reveal1 is utilized by taking the inverse hash function.  
Algorithm 1. 𝑬𝑿𝑷𝟏𝐁𝐌𝐒𝐀𝐌𝐂𝐂
𝑲𝒆𝒚
  
1. Eavesdrop login request, i.e. <Z> in mutual authentication phase, while Z = e(P, P)u . 
2. Call Reveal1 oracle on the input of Z = e(P, P)u  to get u'← reveal1  (e(P, P)u). 
3. Eavesdrop <L2, M1> and <L3, Qi> in mutual authentication phase, where L2= vPpub + H1 
(h(IDj))vP, L3 = uPpub + H1 (h(IDi))uP, M1 = Kij  (h(IDi) || Ri || X ) and 
Qi= H4(Kij || Z || h(IDi)|| h(IDj)). 
4. Call Reveal2 on the input of factor Zi to get (Kij*, Z', h(IDi'), h(IDj)) as (Kij || Z' || h(IDi)|| 
h(IDj))← reveal1(Qi). 
5. Onwards, it calculates Kij*  M1 and then recovers (h(IDi'') || Ri' || X').  
6. Afterwards, it calculates Yi'= (Ppub + H1 (h(IDi))P). 
7. If  [(h(IDi') = = h(IDi'')) AND  e(Ri' , X'+H3(h(IDi') || L2 ||Z'|| h(IDj') ||X' ||Kij*)Yi' ) == e(P,P)] 
Accept the identity IDi' as valid for Ui, and also accept SK= Kij* as a legitimate session key 
for user and server,  
          Return 1 (true) 
8.        Else 
9.     Return 0 (false) 
10.   End if   
 
 
Theorem1 
The contributed protocol would be secure, if a crafty adversary attempts to extract the corresponding 
session key among the legal participants, given the hash digest function h() acts strongly as a random 
oracle.  
Proof.  
 In this proof, the adversary Ӑ who is competent enough to recover the session key among the legal 
participants, employs the oracles Reveal1 and Reveal2 to implement the algorithm 𝐸𝑋𝑃1𝐁𝐌𝐒𝐀𝐌𝐂𝐂
𝐾𝑒𝑦
. The 
probability for success of the algorithm 𝐸𝑋𝑃1𝐁𝐌𝐒𝐀𝐌𝐂𝐂
𝐾𝑒𝑦
 is Suc1=Pr.2[𝐸𝑋𝑃1𝐁𝐌𝐒𝐀𝐌𝐂𝐂
𝐾𝑒𝑦
=1] - 1, whereas, Pr [E] 
indicates the expected probability for the relevant event (E). Here, the advantage function of 𝐸𝑋𝑃1𝐁𝐌𝐒𝐀𝐌𝐂𝐂
𝐾𝑒𝑦
 
is calculated as 𝐴𝑑𝑣 𝐁𝐌𝐒𝐀𝐌𝐂𝐂
𝐾𝑒𝑦
 (t1, q1, q2) = maxӐ [𝑆𝑢𝑐1𝐁𝐌𝐒𝐀𝐌𝐂𝐂
𝐾𝑒𝑦
], in execution time (t1) as well as the Reveal 
query q1 and q2 maximized on adversary Ӑ. We may term the contributed protocol as verifiably secure 
against the adversary to extract the agreed session key SK among the participants, provided the advantage 
𝐴𝑑𝑣 𝐁𝐌𝐒𝐀𝐌𝐂𝐂
𝐾𝑒𝑦
(t1, q1, q2 ) ≤ 𝜀′ for any adequately small 𝜀′ > 0. In accordance with the above experiment, in 
case the adversary Ӑ is capable of approaching private secrets of involved participants, and accessing the 
bilinear map components, it could comfortably extract the original session key SK and ultimately Ӑ wins 
this game. Nonetheless, referring to [15], it becomes infeasible as far as computation is concerned, for 
breaking the corresponding bilinear map as 𝐴𝑑𝑣 𝐁𝐌𝐒𝐀𝐌𝐂𝐂
𝐾𝑒𝑦
 (t1) ≤ 𝜀′ for adequately small 𝜀′ > 0. Thus, our 
contributed protocol might safely be deemed to be secure since the related security features for the hash 
operation are polynomially too hard to break. 
 
 
7.   PERFORMANCE EVALUATION ANALYSIS 
 
In this section, we present the comparative analysis of the contributed scheme with Tsai et al. and few 
contemporary schemes. The Table II shows the functionality comparison for different protocols [24], [38], 
[40]-[43], [44], [34] and our protocol. The proposed scheme is an extended and improved model for Tsai et 
al.’s protocol. Our contributed model is proven to be a robust authenticated key agreement protocol in the 
formal security analysis as demonstrated above. We can witness that the three of those schemes abide by 
the anonymity requirement, i.e. [34], [44] and our scheme. Likewise, majority of the schemes do not fulfill 
the traceability feature excluding [34] and our scheme. We may notice the time-synchronization problem, 
stolen smart card threat, and modification attack in [38], and [40]-[42] as discovered in later schemes. 
While, [38] and [40] do not resist replay attack, and the scheme [42] is found to be vulnerable to password-
guessing attack. In earlier schemes, mostly the protocols were found susceptible to impersonation attacks 
except [24]. In the last, the protocols that enables the mobile user authentication setting to client employing 
identity based cryptography are [24, 34], including our protocol.  
 
Table II: Comparison of security features for different ID-based cryptographic protocols 
          [24] [38] [40] [41] [42] [44] [34] Ours 
Supports Anonymity × × × × × √ √ √ 
Mutual Authentication √ × × × √ × × √ 
Known key secrecy √ × √ × √ √ √ √ 
Untraceable √ × × × × × √ √ 
Defy Modification threat √ × × × × √ √ √ 
Defy offline-password guessing 
threat 
√ √ √ √ × √ √ √ 
Defy Stolen card threat √ × × × × √ √ √ 
Defy Impersonation threat √ × × × × × × √ 
Defy Replay threat √ × × √ √ √ √ √ 
Multi-server Paradigm √ × × × × × √ √ 
Resistance to Time 
Synchronization issues 
√ × × × × √ √ √ 
De-synchronization attack √ √ √ √ √ √ × √ 
 Smart card-based user 
verification 
√ √ √ √ √ √ × √ 
    √: Could resist threat      ×: Could not resist threat 
 
Table III. Number of operations in Tsai and Proposed protocol 
 
          Tsai et al. protocol [34] 
 
Proposed protocol 
Registration messages 1 TPM  1 TPM  
User  4 TPM   4 TPM + 1TBP 
Service provider  2 TPM + 3TBP 3 TPM  + 2TBP 
Computational delay (ms)  6 TPM + 3TBP  ≈  30.75 7 TPM  + 3TBP  ≈  32.98 
 
 
The comparative analysis for the computational costs of Tsai et al.’s and the contributed protocol is 
depicted in Table III. We define the symbol TBP as the time needed to complete for the bilinear pairing-
based operation, and the symbol TPM be the time required to complete scalar point multiplication operation. 
We assume that some computations on the end of user are calculated already, so these are excluded from 
computational cost in the comparison such as yH1(IDi)P, yP, yPub, as shown in Table III. We calculated 
the computational costs by simulating and employing the MIRACL library [67] on a desktop computer (HP 
E8300 Core i5 with 2.93 Ghz processor using Ubuntu 16.10 OS having 4GB RAM), while the time latency 
for TPM and TBP are calculated as 2.214ms and 5.79ms, respectively. The registration procedure for Tsai et 
al. and proposed scheme takes 1TPM of time latency to register the user and server in constructing their 
respective private keys. In mutual authentication step, the user consumes the total time as 4TPM  in Tsai et 
al. scheme, whereas in our contributed scheme, it consumes 4 TPM + 1TBP in mutual authentication phase. 
The server consumes 2 TPM + 3TBP overall time delay for Tsai et al., while in our proposed scheme, it would 
take 3TPM + 2TBP time latency. Although the contributed protocol consumes an extra operation of 1TBP on 
Ui’s side, and 1TPM on the server’s side, nonetheless, the contributed protocol is not susceptible to server 
spoofing or impersonation threat, as Tsai et al.’s protocol stands vulnerable to the same attack. The timing 
for computational cost is calculated for Tsai et al. and our scheme is as 30.75 and 32.98, respectively. The 
cost of the contributed protocol is almost 8% higher than Tsai et al.’s protocol owing to extra point 
multiplications as shown in Table 3 and Figure 3, nonetheless, the former is secure against possible 
impersonation threats. The Figure 3 depicts the graph that demonstrates that although our scheme’s 
computational cost is bit high, yet it is more secure. In contributed protocol, the operation for bilinear map 
is dominant in identity-based cryptography, and lets the server and user in verifying one another’s 
authenticity to establish multiple mutual sessions without involving the registration centre. 
 
 
 Fig. 3. Comparison graph for Tsai et al. and our scheme 
 
In view of the fact that, our contributed protocol is immune of impersonation threats that Tsai et al. could 
not embed in its protocol, therefore, in view of the illustrated performance evaluation analysis, we may 
deduce that the contributed model is far more secure than Tsai et al.’s protocol although it incurs a little 
more necessary additional cost. This is also mention-worthy that the security or immunity from attacks for 
any key agreement protocol is more significant element for practical implementation, while for enhancing 
the security, to a certain extent an additional overhead may be afforded.   
 
8.     CONCLUSION 
 
The mobile cloud computing (MCC) is increasingly finding ways for being embedded in the mobile 
subscriber-based services. Lately, Tsai et al. presented a new mobile user authentication scheme employing 
bilinear pairing operations, to abandon the involvement of trusted third party in the authentication process 
between the participants. Nonetheless, the Tsai et al.’s protocol is found to be vulnerable to server-based 
impersonation and desynchronization attacks. Besides, it also lacks smart card-based user verification in the 
login phase that makes the protocol inapplicable for implementation in access networks. In this context, we 
have put forward an enhanced and secure authentication scheme based on the operation of bilinear pairing, 
enabling to counter many attacks as discovered in Tsai et al. scheme. The contributed protocol, in this 
study, demonstrates the security analysis or formal and informal basis which warrants that the contributed 
protocol is immune of particular known attacks and limitations as faced by earlier protocols.     
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